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Aneta Zacharz
On the Way to Nowhere - Reflections Upon 
the Impossible of Identity
The primacy of reason and the primacy of faith, Athens and Jerusalem - 
these are centuries-old oppositions between which human thought has been os­
cillating through history. The choice of one opposite stance triggers the nega­
tion of the other. Leo Shestov suggests abandoning of all doubts and calls for 
absolute commitment to Jerusalem, or in other words, for absolute faith. The 
search for rational solutions to problems of existence and the need to escape 
from uncertainties resulted in the development of critical thinking in relation 
to what Shestov terms the Crisis of ratio)
In his book titled Apotheosis of Uncertainty Shestov verbalises his convic­
tion that what underlies all philosophical systems is the desire of “understand­
ing.” He claims that human vocation is not to “understand” the unknown but 
to become acquainted with that unknown through experience. Shestov points
1 Twentieth century has been a time of great and radical changes, it has been a time of 
philosophical doubts and hesitations; it has been a time of search for the spiritual salvation 
of mankind. This fever of looking for reasonable solutions and escaping from the chaos of 
thoughts and uncertainties, from “the death of God,” “the agony of Christianity,” “the twi­
light of the West,” “the fall of civilisation,” “rebellion of the masses,” from “the falling night 
of the new Middle Ages” — resulted in the critical manner of thinking, the thinking in rela­
tion to the Crisis. Shestovian thought places itself in that canon of philosophical specula­
tion, in the canon of thinking towards the Crisis. It oscillates between the question of the 
why(s) and the wherefore(s) of this ideological “recession”, and the answer which is to point 
out senses which would change the hitherto existing paradigm of intellectual perception. This 
act of thinking in relation to the Crisis is the constant search for the primitive arche — the 
substructure of the whole European culture of reason (see Cezary Wodziński, Ateny, 
Jerozolima, Rzym ..., in Lew Szestow, Ateny i Jerozolima (Kraków: Znak, 1993, s. 8)). Ali 
quotations in the article and in the footnotes were translated into English by the author. 
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out that “no knowledge, no science can give that, what is brought by darkness.”2 
Light is not able to reveal what lurks in the cracks of our existence. Light may 
only set in order what is on the “veneer” of reality. Such a tension, the tension 
between the emotional and the rational, between the expressible and the in­
effable may culminate in liminal experience, the experience of the sphere 
beyond a discourse, one that does not lend itself to discursivisation. Such an 
experience, reminiscent of the experience of the Kantian sublime, seems to 
propel the intellectual efforts of such thinkers as Kierkegaard, Duns Scotus, 
St. John of the Cross, and Melville. Shestov writes that in the world organised 
by logos two forces influence every human being: centripetal and centrifugal.3 
The former enables us to situate ourselves in the context of the “visible” world. 
Everything that leads to this self-placement is desirable. Only those experi­
ences which activate the centripetal force, such as fear of the ineffable or the 
ordering power of tradition, are cultivated. The centripetal force is the factor 
that enables us to believe in the possibility of “recognition,” “explanation” and 
“definition.” It calls into being the sphere of the “understood” and of the 
“defined.” Everything that casts a shadow upon the structure of the world is 
marginalized. Conversely, the centrifugal force allows one to acknowledge the 
shadowed sphere, the sphere in which ratio proves impotent.
In order to exemplify his theory, in The Overcoming of the Obvious, Shestov 
quotes a parable about the Angel of Death. The Angel of Death, who comes 
to a man to take his soul, is all eyes. It happens, however, that the Angel of 
Death4 comes too early. He leaves the soul in the man’s body intact but before 
‘ Lew Szestow, Apoteoza nieoczywistości (Londyn: Kontra, 1983), p. 88
3 Lew Szestow, Sola Fide. Tylko przez wiarę (Warszawa: Znak, 1993), pp. 58-59.
4 “In one old book of wisdom it was said [...] that the Angel of Death who comes to 
a man so as to separate the soul from the body, is all covered with eyes. Why? Why does 
the Angel need so many eyes — He, who saw in Heaven everything, he, who has nothing 
to see on the earth? And so [...] He has those eyes not for himself. It happens that the Angel 
of Death, who comes to take a soul, convinces himself that He has appeared too early, that 
the time has not come yet to man, so as to leave the earth. He does not touch the soul; He 
does not even come into sight of that soul, but before the departure, He imperceptibly leaves 
that man one more pair of eyes from His innumerable ones. And then, suddenly, the (gifted) 
man starts to see more than the others, more than he/she can see with his/her old eyes; he/ 
she starts to see something completely new. And he/she sees the new in the new way, (but) 
not like (ordinary) people see but like the creatures from “other worlds” (see), in such 
a manner that this new is not “the necessary” but “the free” — it means that it is and at the 
same time it is not, it appears when it disappears and disappears when it appears. Given by 
birth, the former eyes, “as in all of us” testify about that “new” something completely different 
than the eyes left by the Angel. But, as the other senses and our reason are associated with 
the ordinary seeing, and every personal or collective “experience” of man is also associated 
with the ordinary seeing, that new seeing seems to be lawless, absurd, fantastic — simply 
a phantom or hallucination of swinging imagination. It seems to be that the next moment 
madness will come: not the poetic one — the inspired madness about which even the course 
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his departure, He leaves the man an additional pair of eyes. And then, sud­
denly, the (gifted) man starts to see more than others, more than he could see 
with his old eyes. He sees the world in a new way, his vision is no longer human: 
it is a perspective of an alien visitor, of a stranger from out of this world. What 
he sees is and at the same time is not; it appears when it disappears and it 
disappears when it appears.5 What he sees is not a substance from which a shape 
emerges. It is pure negation because there is nothing in what he sees. What 
the man sees with his new eyes is chaos because his gaze is not a differentiating 
vision. As Jolanta Brach-Czaina suggests in Cracks in Existence the very idea 
of differentiation is based upon the act of separating objects from the back­
ground.6 Therefore, the eye of recognition,7 the rational eye, does not pene­
trate, while the new pair of “angelic eyes” allows penetration. They bring the 
man to the sphere of the new. The necessity that results from the unrejectable 
angelic gift is the approval of difficult imperfection. That necessity of entering 
the sphere beyond ratio requires the suspension of the old gaze and, at the same 
time, isolation from the vision of old.8 Therefore, centripetal force makes the 
act of opening oneself so difficult. The new eyes usher in a period of new life. 
Such an opening, such a “birth” of sorts, is the active waiting for the unknown. 
A continuous and permanent movement towards the unreflecting is constitut­
ed. Such waiting gives uncertainty and guarantees it.9 The Angelic gift, the 
books on aesthetics and philosophy speak and which under the name of Eros, Mania or ec­
stasy was described and justified where (it) should be and by whom, but that madness for 
which they put people into the madhouse/lunatic asylum. And then, the fight between the 
natural and non-natural (supernatural) sight begins, the result of which seems to be as prob­
lematic and mysterious as its beginning.” (Leo Shestov, Na wiesach Iowa, trans. Aneta 
Zacharz, Paris: YMCA-Press, 1975, p. 27.)
5 See Lew Szestow, “Przezwyciężenie oczywistości,” Na wiesach Iowa (Paryż: YMCA- 
Press, 1975), p. 27, in Apoteoza nieoczywistości, p. 219.
6 The background is “the undersoil on which something may come to existence. But it 
is not the one that is fertilised but the one that is the naked soil of events and occurrences 
yet unknown. In the background lurks the uncertainty. The background is a substance from 
which a shape emerges. It is pure negation because there is nothing in it and if there were 
anything that could appear because of the nature of the background, it would not belong to 
it. It is chaos because it does not differentiate anything and because the very idea of dif­
ferentiation appears as the act of separation from the background.” (Jolanta Brach-Czaina, 
Szczeliny istnienia (Warszawa: PIW, 1992), p. 108.)
7 Recognition is only identification based upon one to one relations.
8 As Jolanta Brach-Czaina writes: “[...] there is no need for opening up to the events 
that attract us because we are always open to them and ready to participate in them. The 
necessity of opening assumes the preceeding closing and isolation - that means lack of ac­
ceptance. If being requires opening to itself as the absolute condition, it means that imper­
fection is its indispensable feature. Therefore, it is so difficult to open oneself onto it.” (Jolanta 
Brach-Czaina, Szczeliny istnienia, pp. 34-35.)
9 “The experience of the first exit as the experience of passing from what is known and 
domesticated to what is unknown and strange, as the experience of initiation into destiny. 
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acceptance of which is an act of initiation, imparts to the man of Shestovian 
parable knowledge about himself as of a being that longs for the unknown and 
who dwells in uncertainty. This in-between sphere is a liminal sphere between 
the dark and the light, but belongs nowhere; it is and it is not, it appears when 
it disappears and disappears when it appears. Finding himself in the sphere of 
unknown the Shestovian man dwells in the realm of verbal and mental silence. 
To be bom as the author of Cracks in Existence says means to accept our own 
separateness.10 *To be born means to manifest oneself in one’s identity, an 
identity “that not only allows for a multiplicity of incarnations, but also de­
mands it.”11 In its strangeness, the domain of the uncertain appears to be hostile 
because it may blur the sight of the real in terms of I-see-what-I-know.12 The 
discourse of hierarchized structures makes it difficult for us to see “beyond” 
the ratio. Categorical discourse postulates thinking in terms of necessity. 
Dwelling in the world of ratio, one necessarily follows the rules of ratio, whether 
reflectively or unreflectively. According to Shestov such behaviour takes its 
root in amartology, the reflection upon the original sin.13 The sense of the 
original sin lies in illegality of insight, which took place when the Tree of Death 
threw a shadow upon the Tree of Life and rendered man obliged to entrust his 
orientation to reason. By that breach, man lost the opportunity of participating 
in the Absolute. This eradication from the absolute left man with a language 
incapable of expressing and describing what lies beyond “the formed” and “the 
explained.” Such a rational paradigm of thinking places us in a being towards 
death. The incapacity of language becomes a tangible manifestation of absence, 
which is best illustrated by the Levinasian concept of the Other. Thus, in order 
to make possible human access to Meaning, language must annihilate what it 
A continuous and permanent movement towards the unconscious is by then constituted. It 
gives uncertainty. It guarantees it. From the very beginning in the existential condition anx­
iousness is inscribed. That is taught by the act of initiation. So, the original initiation im­
plants in us knowledge about ourselves as creatures that miss the unknown and who dwell 
in uncertainty. Tempted by the mystery, awakened by its alluring radiation, we are confronted 
with the unknowable.” (Jolanta Brach-Czaina, Szczeliny istnienia, p. 37.)
10 “To be born means to accept and confirm our own separateness but also to experience 
strangeness. To move from place to place - always as if not our, to be aware that separate­
ness or even strangeness of the particular beings may be good that is inscribed into the whole, 
to which we belong.” (Jolanta Brach-Chaina, Szczeliny istnienia, p. 40.)
"Jolanta Brach-Czaina, Szczeliny istnienia, p. 69.
12 See Jolanta Brach-Czaina, “Wnikanie,” in Szczeliny istnienia.
13 “The sin is knowledge. The moment when the first human consumed the fruit of 
cognisance, he gained knowledge but he lost freedom. Man does not need cognisance. To 
pose questions and problems, to demand facts and answers, means that man is not free. To 
cognise means to cognise necessity. Knowledge and freedom are not compatible.” 
(B. Fondane, “Recontres avec Lew Chestov” (Paris: 1982), pp. 126-127, in Lew Szestow, 
Ateny i Jerozolima, p. 31.)
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describes in a way that would render the encountered being as emptiness and 
inexpressibility. Understanding in the categories of ratio, is tantamount to the 
death of meaning. By labelling being, man annihilates truths present in those 
beings, and by that, he sentences them to exile from the world of discourse.14 
Only in that exile do beings acquire a distance from discourse and they are 
placed in the context of uncertainty. Thus, language is a negation of meaning. 
In its original sense the negation results from the Levinasian desire because 
it is not language that is asked questions or searched but it is itself that, searches 
and asks.15 In this way distance bestows sense upon language. The absence 
of one to one relations between word and object breeds our desire to move into 
the sphere of negation. To say nothing is the only hope of saying everything.16 
Realisation of apophatic thinking is not simple because we feel safer when 
operating in a cataphatic paradigm. Even if we put the subject of a word to 
death, there remains an idea of that subject functioning in, one-to-one relation 
with the word. Then, the absent becomes present by transformation of the absent 
into language. Blanchot writes that language of literature, which combines in 
itself both uneasiness and contradictions, tries to talk about things and prob­
lems that cannot be talked about. By this means, language tries to go beyond 
all limitations even if its user is “aware” of them. Such a language is “aware” 
that “the infinite absence of understanding could not be equal to the limited 
and defined presence of a word.”17
The aim of the “centrifugal” language would be to evoke “understanding 
of the movement that escapes definitions.”18 It would like to reach the ideal 
absence of sense, completely present in that absence and for that absence. The 
awareness of that language opening towards the absent is the starting point for 
the act of thinking towards and from death. Language then, becomes the 
execution of negation. By that, its principle is the lack of what it lacks. The 
sentence “when I talk, death talks inside me”19 is an attempt to express the 
indispensable distance between the speaker and what is being described. That 
14 As Maurice Blanchot says: “[...] a word gives being but it gives being lacking being. 
A word is the absence of that being', it is its nothingness, it is what had been left when it lost 
being. It means, a word is only a fact that a word is absent.” (Maurice Blanchot, Wokół Kafki 
(Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR, 1996) p. 28.)
15 See Maurice Blanchot, Wokół Kafki (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR, 1996), p. 30.
16 By means of the absence of one to one relations this extant breeds a desire of living 
in the sphere of negation because “if about things one says only what makes them nothing, 
then to say nothing is the only hope of saying everything. Language perceives that it owes 
its sense not to what exists but just to the distance against the existence and it feels the temp­
tation of stopping at that distance of getting to the very essence of negation. It is tempted 
to make with nothing everything.” (Maurice Blanchot, Wokół Kafki, p. 30.)
17 Ibid., p. 31.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 29.
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can be explained in terms of centrifugal force, which pushes our identity towards 
a new sphere of semiotic and semantic sensation. Semiotic, because of the 
symbolic nature of language experienced during the centrifugal movement; 
semantic, because of the multitude of transformations of relations holding 
between language and a “sign” which allows us to perceive “reality” in 
a number of ways. Owing to that, the experience of inexpressibility results in 
acts of thinking in terms of the search to sense beyond sense. Consequently, 
in the light of the desire to experience the ineffable what is Athenian falls in 
value. Athens and Jerusalem metaphorically parallel the Levinasian opposition 
between the myth of Odysseus and the parable about Abraham.20 The expe­
dition of Odysseus, having for its aim the return to Ithaca, is a parable of 
language in the Hellenic style. The searching language finds its arche of sense 
in itself. The journey of Odysseus is propelled by the centripetal force. Because 
it knows its destination, the journey is in fact passivity and a defined sojourn. 
It appears to be a parallel to the Levinasian “need.”21 This need results from 
an emptiness that can be quenched by the object of that need. Thus, only knowl­
edge appears to be a fulfilment of the need of the human mind because it fills 
the empty space of the question with discursive structures, it domesticates the 
object of its transcendence and comes back to itself. The need of reason is 
appeased with the assimilation of the Other in the Same: what is known 
embraces what is unknown. Odysseus knows the answer to the question: where 
am I going? Conversely, Abraham does not know the answer but he abandons 
the search for what can be known and takes a road towards the unknown. “He 
initiates an uninterrupted movement towards the Other of the sense - different 
than the sense as a lingual ‘event’.”22 The experience of language in the bib­
lical way is a renouncement, repudiation and negation. The wandering of 
Abraham is the search for the source of the sense “beyond-the-outspoken.” 
Therefore, the journey of Abraham is desire. As Levinas claims: it is a “reversed 
need” that cannot be satisfied. It assimilates the Same in the Other, transcends 
hierarchized discourse and transforms it to the ineffable. The only knowledge 
of Abraham is a no-knowledge of place.
Thus, the birth towards death is the rejection of the language that speaks 
about what is. At the same time the language of apophatic discourse is the search 
for the moment, which precedes language itself and which now is more than 
negation. Shestov seems to suggest that it is the search for the amartological 
pre-source. This language says that it does not represent. It is. So the aim of 
20 See Emmanuel Levinas, O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl (Kraków: Znak, 1994).
21 Emmanuel Levinas, O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl, pp. 14-19.
22 “Abraham initiates an uninterrupted movement towards the Other of the sense — 
different than the sense as a lingual ‘event’ - uninterrupted means impossible to break in 
the regress of the return to the starting point”. (Cezary Wodziński, Hermes i Eros (Warszawa: 
IFIS PAN, 1997), p. 130.)
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that language is in the reverse of concepts, in understatements and unremitting 
interpretation and translation of what is written “with” a letter of the indistinc­
tiveness. Deliverance towards death is not tantamount to the awakening in death. 
It is rather the act of closing oneself to the unknown; as the immanent delimits 
the transcendent, the language of reason delimits mutuality. Therefore, it is 
possible to say that mystical experience, which we go through using angelic 
eyes, brings knowledge, but this knowledge does not have a systemic charac­
ter. It is a certain kind of intuition, vision or picture that cannot be transformed 
into a discourse. Such knowledge is silent. But paradoxically, this silence can 
be expressed, though partially, only by means of the words rejected earlier. Such 
calmness of words leads to transcendence, the absolute identity, that emerges 
from the dark and the absent (and) achieves triumphs in darkness and absence. 
The idea of the Infinity of transcendence leads thinking beyond itself and thus 
places our identity beyond itself. Thus, the more profound the revelation of 
the centrifugal force is, the more shapeless the illumination is. Such an illu­
mination has a direct character, one of mystical experience. There is no room 
for any discourse because as Shestov writes, “[...] the Lord said that (He) would 
live in the dark. (His) native element is thus darkness of which man is afraid 
more than of any other thing.”23 Therefore absolute identity can be gained only 
in the dark. According to Shestov contemplation of the “Divine” needs an un­
justified transition from the state of ratio to the state of the ineffable. Such 
a transition becomes the experience of the not-articulated and leads to the 
domain where identity can be arrived at.
Birth towards death and from death delimits the sphere of spiritual hesi­
tation. It sanctions the true use of the language of negation as the mediator, 
one that should express doubts about human existence. Being bom towards 
death and from death means abandoning the tame world of discourse that is 
no longer, if it ever was, able to tell the story about what lies beyond the already 
crossed border. We no longer dwell in the frames of cataphatic paradigm. We 
start to look at the reality yielding to the centrifugal force that opens us to the 
mystical experience. And this mystical experience becomes the sphere where 
the search for identity can find its fulfilment. This identity is not the identity 
of Odysseus that knows its starting point and its end-point. It is the absolute 
one which could only be found outside Plato’s cave. It is the identity of Ab­
raham that knows its beginning but which unremittingly, unceasingly and con­
stantly asks about its “where.” It is the identity of the ceaseless wandering. 
Therefore, the place of our “real” arche, telos, identity lies beyond what is 
brought by the rational, in what is apophatic, in the sphere of uncertainty. Thus, 
the question about identity is absolute and ultimate and it calls for an absolute 
and ultimate answer - it requires the impossible. Shestov seems to suggest that 
23 Lew Szestow, Sola Fide, p. 249.
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to gain the absolute identity one has to abandon speech, and in silence has to 
enter the “negative” stage of life.
* * *
Answers to such questions as “what is your name?” “where do you come 
from?”, “what do you like?” depicts our place in the world of ratio. Answers 
to these questions can tell us about nothing but about our place of living or 
they can name or constitute our identity in the world of discourse. These answers 
imprison identity in the sphere of the visible, possible, and explainable and point 
out that the question about the “where” of identity - that is, about the sphere 
where identity is constituted, cannot be posed and answered while using the 
tools of ratio. Dwelling in the world of ratio, beings can talk only about identity 
of cataphatic order provoked to the centripetal force that pulls us to the tra­
dition of logos and its rationalistic discourse. This order appears to be a realm 
in which there is nothing beyond the category. Therefore, the questions which 
arise are whether it is possible to distance ourselves from the tradition of ratio 
and from the language that is brought along by that tradition, whether we are 
able to reach the place in which the discursive identity falls in value, and 
whether it is possible to describe that very place. In the course of my argu­
ment I use elements of Shestovian, Levinasian, Blanchotian philosophies and 
the elements of Brach-Czaina’s thought so as to put forward the thesis that the 
place in which identity is constituted is the sphere of absence, liminality that 
calls to existence the realm of negation. It is performed in the way of the 
transformation of the possibility of language and perception of the world into 
the impossibility of that language and perception of the world and their an­
nihilation.
